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Abstract (250 words) 
 
Cooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalized 
model exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may be 
selected over, the more common investor owned business firm.  It is shown within a 
generic transaction game that cooperatives fill both producer and consumer roles as an 
aggregated player that is expected to maximize aggregate producer and consumer payoffs 
rather than maximizing either payoff separately, which contrasts with investor owned 
firms as essentially two player games between separate and competing producers and 
consumers where each player seeks to maximize their separate payoff individually.  A 
cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate the expected differences 
between these one-player versus two-player games, which clearly demonstrates that 
cooperatives are expected to achieve greater total payoffs and social welfare relative to 
investor owned firms, because investor owned firms generate dead weight loss when 
maximizing producer surpluses as expected under prevailing microeconomic theory.  The 
use of cardinal payoff values rather than ordinal is important because it permits 
aggregation of payoffs within the model, and because it directly reflects the cardinal 
payoffs actually used in agribusiness decisions, such as revenue, expense and profit 
measures.  The results may indicate the reason that cooperative firms are selected and 
have been successful in agribusiness.  However, weaknesses of the cooperative model are 
also discussed, conjecturing that cooperatives may be preferable to investor owned 
businesses under limited circumstances but because these circumstances occur frequently 
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One of the most unique aspects of agribusiness and rural enterprises in general, relative to 
other industries and urban enterprises in general, is the prevalent use of cooperative 
business forms in agribusinesses relative to the prevalence of investor owned firms 
elsewhere.  This is not to say that stock companies, sole proprietorships and other forms 
of investor owned business are not present in agribusiness, or that producer or consumer 
owned cooperatives are not present in urban settings, just that they are more prevalent in 
rural and agribusiness settings.   
Because of this prevalence, it is understandable that rural communities familiar 
with the cooperative business model might continue to use them as new needs and 
projects developed, thereby augmenting the prevalence of the model in rural 
agribusinesses.  For example, while the cooperative model originated as purchasing 
cooperatives in the United Kingdom (Thompson 1995), it quickly spread to marketing 
cooperatives, consumer-owned cooperatives, and even in to rural utilities such as 
electricity and telephony (LeVay 1983, Cobia 1989).  The choice for predominantly 
agriculture-oriented rural communities was clear.  They went with the organization form 
they knew best for collective activity.  A form of organization that had proven successful 
in continuous operation over the course of decades, despite rarely being mentioned, much 
less taught, in mainstream business schools to this day.  Yet despite its proven success 
with cooperatives growing into multi-million dollar international firms in billion-dollar 
industries, even the strongest practical advocates and most studied scholarly experts 
regarding cooperatives have a difficult time explaining exactly why cooperatives are 
successful, much less how or why they may be different from and potentially preferable 
to the vastly more studied and better understood investor owned business model.  A 
cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to address this gap in the literature toward 
a better understanding of the cooperative model, especially as it compares with investor-
owned companies. 
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Cooperatives are a type of business firm distinguished from other types of firms primarily 
as being owned by their users (Cobia 1989).  There are many different types of firms that 
are classified as cooperatives, but this aspect of user ownership is consistent in the 
definition of cooperatives (LeVay 1983).  Users are any economic actors that could 
otherwise conduct business with a different business entity through market transactions, 
but select to transact with the cooperative firm instead (Nourse 1922, Albaek and Schultz 
1998).  For example, a cooperative may be owned by the producers of its inputs, by 
suppliers of its labor, or by the consumers (customers) of its products and services 
(Bartlett et al 1992, Craig 1992, Anderson et al 1979).  When such actors are both the 
cooperative’s users (as customers, producers, labor, etc.) and the cooperative’s owners, 
this places the same economic actors in two roles relative to the same firm.  Importantly, 
the two roles normally have opposing objectives in non-cooperative business forms, such 
as the conflicting roles of owners seeking higher prices (to increase profits) versus 
customers seeking lower prices.  This is the case for agribusiness cooperative customers 
also owning their cooperatives and thereby having two roles filled by the same 
individuals as user/owenrs, versus investor-owned utilities filling both roles with 
separate, non-integrated actors in competition for available surpluses from the 
transactions that result. 
This is important because the dynamics change when both roles are filled by the 
same economic actors, but explaining how, why, and the resulting benefits in a rigorous 
yet understandable manner has seemed elusive.  In fact, there are many theories regarding 
the benefits of the cooperative form of enterprise, largely based upon potential benefits 
from collective action represented by the firm generally (Coase 1937, 1960, North 1990).  
Hansmann (1988, 1996) indicates that cooperatives may be capable of reducing 
transaction costs for their owners relative to market transactions, consistent with 
Transaction Cost Economics but ignoring potential benefits from vertical integration 
aside from transaction cost differentials.  Hart and Moore (1996) argue that member One Player Games versus Two Player Games - Page 5 of 20 
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cooperatives provide governance advantages, and Ostram (2000, 2003) shows through 
game theory and experiment that cooperatives and collective action may be capable of 
solving difficult problems such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma.   
Operationally, cooperatives are also theorized to provide a means of 
accomplishing various objective functions that are difficult to achieve in markets (Nourse 
1922, Sexton 1990, Ghoshal and Moran 1996, Dierker and Grodal 1999).  In fact, a 
consistent concept behind the various theories regarding cooperatives is that their benefits 
are generally not consistent with profit maximization by the firm.  For example, worker 
owned firms may strive to maximize salaries or to ensure job security at the expense of 
firm profitability (Jones and Svejnar 1985, Craig 1992).  Producer owned firms may seek 
to guarantee delivery rights or maximize input prices paid to the producer-owners (Bonin 
et al 1993, Choi and Feinerman 1993), and consumer-owned firms may maximize owner 
value derived through consumption of the firms’ products (Enke 1945).  Yet none of the 
existing literature seems to be widely accepted, much less utilized, within cooperatives 
themselves or within academia beyond a relative few specialists in the field. 
This is not despite efforts to use cooperatives in academic research, although to 
date cooperatives have primarily been assumed to be profit maximizing investor owned 
firms where the investors just happen to be users as well, in virtually all empirical studies 
on them (Bonin et al 1993).  Specifically, empirical research on cooperatives 
predominantly assumes that profit maximization is the primary objective function (Choi 
and Feinerman 1993, Albaek and Shultz 1998), generally concluding that cooperatives 
are inefficient as profit maximizers relative to investor-owned firms in the same 
industries (Porter and Scully 1987, Lerman and Parliament 1994).  However, it is 
important to note that the existing empirical research generally does not study profit 
maximization directly, but rather compares cost minimization questions as a question of 
economic duality with profit maximization.  In that regard, Akridge and Hertel (1992) 
found empirical evidence of excess capacity in cooperatives causing higher costs relative 
to investor owned firms, and separate studies found evidence of significant 
overinvestment in capital by cooperatives relative to investor owned firms that led to One Player Games versus Two Player Games - Page 6 of 20 
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higher costs and lower profitability (Sexton et al 1989, Caputo and Lynch 1993).  
Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995) found evidence that cooperatives misallocate debt 
capital and other inputs in comparison with investor owned firms, and Schroeder (1992) 
found inefficiencies in supply chain management leading to higher costs and lower 
profits in cooperatives relative to investor owned firms.  Hardesty and Salgia (2004) go 
further, stating that empirical evidence indicates that cooperatives “destroy owner value”.   
However, and importantly, the majority of cooperatives state that their objective 
is not profit maximization (Cobia 1989), as assumed in the studies discussed above.  In 
fact, other studies tacitly assume that cooperatives do not maximize profit like investor 
owned firms, indicating that cooperatives and investor owned firms are demonstrably 
different but can coexist in the same market, and that the presence of cooperatives may 
improve the economic value received by consumers from all firms (Sexton and Sexton 
1979, Neary and Ulph 1997).  It is further recognized that a firm does not have to 
maximize profitability to be successful (Jensen 2002), especially when the firm is not 
publicly traded (Dutta and Radner 1999).  In turn, empirical frameworks to test whether 
primary cooperative objective functions are something other than profit maximization 
have been proposed (Sexton 1990, Dierker and Grodal 1999, Giannakas and Fulton 
2005), and there has been limited success testing for empirical evidence of non-profit 
maximizing objective functions in cooperatives, especially within labor-owned firms 
(Craig and Pencavel 1992, Bartlett et al 1992).  However, the majority of proposed 
structures have not generated significant empirical results (Lawson 1992), generally 
attributed to a lack of suitable data to conduct the proposed research (Gupta and Kohl 
1990, Bonin et al 1993), as well as difficulties separating the effects of agency problems 
from differences in objective functions (Sexton and Iskow 1993, Cook 1995).   
But as mentioned, none of this work has provided a concise means of 
satisfactorily explaining the differences of cooperatives relative to investor owned firms, 
that is both rigorous enough for academic research and understandable enough for use by 
cooperative professionals and other practitioners such as analysts and public officials. 
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To help fill this gap and contribute to a better understanding of cooperatives in relation to 
investor-owned firms, a simple but cardinally valued game theoretic model is used to 
compare the expected strategies of a single player within a “one player game” where both 
roles of producer and consumer are assumed by an integrated player, as contrasted with 
the expected strategies of separate players in two player games such as prevalent in the 
investor owned model where the roles of producer and consumer are filled by non-
integrated players.  A cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate 
these expected differences between one-player and two-player games, to clearly 
demonstrate that cooperatives are expected to achieve greater total payoffs and social 
welfare relative to investor owned firms, because investor owned firms generate dead 
weight loss when maximizing producer surpluses as expected under prevailing 
microeconomic theory that can be avoided in a one player agribusiness.  The use of 
cardinal payoff values rather than ordinal is important because it permits aggregation of 
payoffs within the model, and because it directly reflects the cardinal payoffs actually 
used in agribusiness decisions, such as revenue, expense and profit measures.   
This cardinally valued matrix is achieved by simply placing the expected payoffs 
within a standard supply and demand analysis in to a game theoretic matrix.  Under this 
common model and using basic neoclassical microeconomic assumptions, we know that 
at any given price and quantity combination the resulting Consumer Surplus and 
Producer Surplus may be calculated, and these surpluses may be used as payoffs from the 
transaction at any price and quantity combination.  In fact, these facts are so well 
documented in most basic economics textbooks that they are neither surprising nor 
unique, and therefore are not replicated here.  However, it is less widely discussed that 
there are four likely equilibriums within supply and demand analysis (Cobia 1989): 
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(1) Supply = Demand; where Marginal Cost = Average Revenue, Social Welfare 
is maximized, and neither players have prevailing market power (such as 
under perfect or pure competition) 
(2) Profit Maximization; where Marginal Cost = Marginal Revenue, and Producer 
Surpluses are maximized because the producer has prevailing market power 
(3) Consumer Surplus Maximization subject to a no-loss provision (no negative 
Producer surplus), because the consumer has prevailing market power 
(4) No Transaction, where negotiations between producers and consumers fail 
and therefore both surpluses are zero (the supply and demand graph origin) 
 
In turn, each of these four equilibriums provides distinct price and quantity 
combinations permitting the calculation of producer and consumer surpluses under each 
equilibrium, providing distinct cardinally valued payoffs under the most common and 
expected conditions and neoclassical assumptions of positively sloped Supply and 
negatively sloped Demand that may be used in a concise and universal four cell game 
theoretic matrix.  Further, under neoclassical assumptions we know that these cardinal 
values will follow a predictable pattern of inequalities (that again may be verified in most 
basic economics textbooks and therefore are not replicated fully here) as follows: 
PS2 > PS1 > PS3 > PS4 
CS3 > CS1 > CS2 > CS4 
PSx = Producer Surplus at equilibrium x as indicated above 
CSx = Consumer Surplus at equilibrium x 
 
As such, the resulting cardinally valued matrix demonstrates that transactions 
within a standard supply and demand analysis have two non-maximal Nash equilibriums 
and a single weakly dominant Nash equilibrium corresponding to neoclassical profit 
maximization as shown in Figure 1 on the next page.  This includes the expected 
preferences between generic strategies within a two player game including the payoff 
inequality relationship as listed for the four equilibriums above.  Of course, in itself this One Player Games versus Two Player Games - Page 9 of 20 
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is not surprising as it merely confirms traditional neoclassical supply and demand 
analysis, especially in relation to Social Welfare and Dead Weight Loss analysis, 
although the facts that it confirms well known and proven tenets of microeconomic 
theory help support the use of the model for comparisons of agribusiness cooperatives 
and investor owned firms.  This comparative analysis is the contribution of this paper. 
 




Although Figure 1 above describes what is expected from neoclassical economic 
theory as explained previously, it is not particularly easy to work with analytically.  
Therefore, arbitrarily selected numerical values may be used in the matrix to better 
demonstrate the preferences and choices being made by separate non-integrated 
producers and consumers in a two player game, and by an integrated player in a one 
player game such as within an agribusiness cooperative.  This is shown in Figure 2 on the 
next page, which corresponds to the producer and consumer surpluses shown at the top of 
the next page as calculated from an actual supply and demand graph, although 
reconstructing the detailed calculations here is unnecessary because the relationship of 
inequalities is the important characteristics for analysis and are maintained.  Again, the 
subscript identification correlates to the four equilibriums discussed above. 
Supply = Demand 
(MC=AR; SW Max) 
PS1 , CS1 
(from above) 
Profit Maximization 
(MC=MR; PS Max) 
PS2 ( > PS1) 
CS2 ( > CS4) 
Cons. Surplus Max* 
 (AC=AR; CS Max) 
PS3 ( = PS4),  
CS3 ( > CS1) 
No Transaction 
(No Equilibrium) 
PS4 ( = PS3) 










*CS Max = Consumer Surplus Maximum subject to Producer No-Loss Provision 
Weakly Dominant Nash Equilibrium designated by circled cell 
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(PS2=10.5) > (PS1=8.0) > (PS3=0.0) = (PS4=0.0) 
(CS3=12.5) > (CS1=8.0) > (CS2=4.5) > (CS4=0.0) 
 
 




Figure 2 clearly demonstrates what is expected under neoclassical economic 
theory for a two party transaction between non-integrated producers and consumers, 
which is the same that is expected under game theory for a two player game between 
non-integrated players.  The fact that the profit maximizing equilibrium is the weakly 
dominant strategy is expected, as well as the fact that total Social Welfare is not 
maximized at profit maximization (but where producer surpluses are maximized), 
indicating the existence of Dead Weight Loss in the game.  In fact, within the context of 
this game matrix, Social Welfare is equal to the aggregate of producer and consumer 
surpluses, which may be easily added to the matrix as shown in bold in Figure 3 below.   
Please note that the aggregate surpluses - which may equivalently be called 
aggregate social welfare - are the total payoffs available in the game; and in turn, are the 
potential total payoffs available to perfectly coordinated players.  This is important 
because perfect coordination between the players is not only possible if one player 
performs both producer and consumer roles in the game – in fact perfect coordination is 










Strategy 1  Strategy 2 
Strategy 2 
Consumer 
Weakly Dominant Nash Equilibrium 
designated by circled cell 
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Figure 3:  Cardinally Valued Matrix with Aggregate Surpluses (in bold) 
 
 
In other words, we expect dead weight loss within the weakly dominant Nash 
equilibrium if two separate producer and consumer players are competing to maximize 
their own individual surpluses.  However, should we expect the same Nash Equilibrium 
to hold if both producer and consumer roles are filled by the same, integrated player?  For 
example, what if the Consumers own the company and thereby have control over 
operational and pricing practices and policies through control of the Board of Directors 
and thereby management of the company?  In this case, the Consumers are essentially 
also the Producers in the transaction; or stated differently, the same integrated player has 
control over both roles and is thereby capable of perfect coordination between the 
players.  In this case we expect that the integrated actor will prefer the highest payoffs 
available and thereby will focus upon the aggregate surpluses because they represent the 
maximum payoffs possible.  The preferences for such an integrated player capable of 
perfect coordination between the two roles are shown in Figure 4 on the next page. 
This result from a one player game that perfectly coordinates between the two 
roles should not be surprising, but is both novel and important because it clearly 
demonstrates what should be expected within the agribusiness cooperative model, 
because this single player dynamic is exactly what is available within the cooperative 
model that differentiates it from the investor owned model.  In fact, this matrix 
demonstrates that for a one player game where both roles are perfectly coordinated by the 
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Figure 4:  Matrix Maximizing Aggregate Surpluses (one-player game) 
 
strictly dominant Nash equilibrium consistent with social welfare maximization.  This 
directly contrasts with the weakly dominant Nash equilibrium of profit maximization in 
the two player game above, and thereby clearly demonstrates what may be the key 
difference between agribusiness cooperatives as one player games versus the investor 
owned business model as two player games.  Simply, they have different objective 





The foregoing analysis has shown a new and potentially important way of evaluating the 
cooperative business model, which demonstrates that agribusiness cooperatives may be 
most accurately represented as one player games.  In turn, because transactions within a 
one player game are capable of perfect coordination, we expect that agribusiness 
cooperatives will pursue strategies that maximize social welfare within the transaction, 
because the entire social welfare within the transaction accrues to the same integrated 
producer / consumer player, which may be the customer/owner, worker/owner, or 
user/owner of a cooperative through the aggregate surpluses that may be achieved.  In 
other words, it is expected that within agribusiness cooperatives the integrated player will 
not select to maximize either producer or consumer surpluses individually, because either 










Strategy 1  Strategy 2 
Strategy 2 
Integrated Producer / Consumer 
Integrated 
Consumer / Producer 
Strictly Dominant Nash Equilibrium designated by circled cell 
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textbooks as well as shown above) that reduces the payoffs to the integrated player; and 
because a single integrated player is capable of perfect coordination to maximize the total 
payoff any strategy other than the strictly dominant Nash equilibrium correlating to 
aggregate surplus maximization is irrational and therefore not expected.  This stands in 
contrast to the two player investor owned model which expects the weakly dominant 
Nash equilibrium of profit maximization (producer surplus maximization) along with its 
necessary dead weight loss, because in a two player game each player is expected to 
maximize their individual surplus, which is merely rational for non-integrated players.   
Or perhaps to state it more succinctly, this analysis demonstrates that with 
identical transactions and available payoffs while assuming rational players, we expect 
distinctly different strategies from a one player game (where both roles are perfectly 
coordinated) and a two player game (where both roles are competitive rather than 
perfectly coordinated).  In turn, because agribusiness cooperatives are more similar to one 
player games, and the investor owned model is more similar to two player games, we 
should expect them to be distinctly different in the payoffs they pursue - and the 
strategies they choose to pursue them - through company policies and practices.   
For example, in day to day decisions an investor owned firm is expected to select 
the strategy that maximizes profit almost regardless of its effect on social welfare, but in 
the same day to day decisions an agribusiness cooperative should be expected to select 
the strategy that maximizes social welfare rather than profit or any other individual 
surplus.  Far different than the prevailing assumption in cooperative literature that 
agribusiness cooperatives have the same objectives as investor firms but are apparently 
merely inefficient profit maximizing firms, this analysis demonstrates that an accurate 
analysis of agribusiness cooperatives must at least consider them as one player games 
with distinctly different strategies and payoffs relative to investor owned firms, and 
therefore the two types of firms should be considered exclusive and distinct. 
In truth, though, it must be acknowledged that a one player game is trivial from 
the perspective of game theory, just as one player playing Chess or Poker against 
themselves may be, and is perhaps even boring.  However, this should not indicate that One Player Games versus Two Player Games - Page 14 of 20 
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one player games are trivial and uninteresting from a more general economic perspective 
specifically because these one player games appear capable of achieving significant 
economic goals, most notably social welfare maximization (which requires reduction of 
dead weight loss), better coordination of transactions, and the like.  In fact, perhaps the 
entire point of the cooperative business model – and the reason that it has succeeded and 
thrived within agribusinesses for so many decades - is that it removes the “excitement” of 
competition in two player games along with its hazards, by instead focusing solely on the 
“boring” task of achieving the maximum payoffs available from the game due to the 
absence of competition.   
This raises an important question, though: if the cooperative model is apparently 
capable of such significant economic benefits, why is it not the prevailing model of the 
firm across all industries?  The literature on both cooperatives and investor owned firms 
indicate that the latter far outweigh the former in virtually every category, from number 
of firms to total profits.  This is an interesting question that requires significant future 
work, but perhaps it is as simple as the nature of one player games.   
Of course, the potential for vertical integration to create a cooperative one player 
game is necessary, but assuming this and for purposes of discussion, perhaps the reason 
that cooperatives are not more prevalent outside of agribusiness is simply that regardless 
of their potential benefits one player games are not as interesting or “exciting” as two 
player games, either for academic researchers or professional businesspeople.  However, 
rural communities and agribusinesses are known for favoring the most efficient methods 
of production that involve the lowest risk, or stated differently, they tend to accept boring 
low risk options so long as they get the job done.  Perhaps the prevalence of agribusiness 
cooperatives is nothing more than tolerance for boring but productive tools within rural 
communities in any form they take, and thereby may be the reason that cooperatives are 
so prevalent in agribusinesses and rural communities generally.  However, this is based 
primarily on anecdotal evidence and a categorical determination to this effect requires 
more work, but this appears to offer a promising area for future research on a business 
model that appears potentially capable of significant economic benefits. One Player Games versus Two Player Games - Page 15 of 20 




One of the most unique aspects of Agribusiness and rural enterprises in general, relative 
to other industries and urban enterprises in general, is the prevalent use of cooperative 
business forms relative to the prevalence of investor owned firms elsewhere.  Yet despite 
the proven success of cooperatives over decades and growth into multi-million dollar 
international firms in billion-dollar industries, even the strongest practical advocates and 
most studied scholarly experts regarding cooperatives have a difficult time explaining 
exactly why cooperatives are successful, much less how or why they may be different 
from and selected over the vastly more studied and better understood investor owned 
business model.  This article helps fill this gap by showing that agribusiness cooperatives 
may essentially be one player games, whereas investor owned firms involve essentially 
two player games, which results in different expected strategies, payoffs and Nash 
equilibriums based solely on whether the game is being played by two non-integrated 
producer and consumer players than by a single integrated single player capable of 
prefect coordination within transactions.  In fact, perfect coordination within one player 
games makes social welfare maximization not only possible, but expected, which 
contrasts sharply with the expectation of dead weight loss under the Nash equilibrium 
corresponding to profit maximization in a two player game.  An analysis is presented to 
support these conclusions, but also acknowledges that one player games are boring 
despite their advantages, which may help explain their prevalence in agribusiness and 
rural communities, but not in urban communities or academic literature.  Potential exists 
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